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RACIAL PURGES
Robert L. Tsai*
THE CHINESE MUST GO: VIOLENCE, EXCLUSION, AND THE MAKING
OF THE ALIEN IN AMERICA. By Beth Lew-Williams. Cambridge and
London: Harvard University Press. 2018. Pp. 244. $24.95.
INTRODUCTION
On the rainy morning of November 3, 1885, some 500 armed white men
visited the home and business of every single Chinese person living in Ta-
coma, Washington. As the skies wept, the mob roused all 200 of them, in-
cluding women, children, and the elderly, and marched them through the
mud to the outskirts of town. Those who could afford a ticket were seen off
on the next train. Those who could not make fare had to keep walking in the
hope of seeking refuge in Portland, nearly 150 miles to the south. The next
day, Chinese-owned businesses and homes were set on fire to ensure that the
people driven out would not feel welcome to return.
In The Chinese Must Go: Violence, Exclusion, and the Making of the Al-
ien in America, historian Beth Lew-Williams1 recounts this horrific episode
(pp. 96–102), along with several others, in clear prose and with impressive
insight. She offers a “transcalar history”—a deep dive into the Chinese expe-
rience in America on multiple levels at once: local, national, and internation-
al (p. 10). Lured to the United States by the gold rush, most Chinese
migrants quickly learned that their hope for instant wealth was little more
than a fleeting dream (p. 23). Most wound up having to take low-paying jobs
in agriculture, manufacturing, and the service industry (p. 35). This sudden,
increased integration along economic and spatial dimensions turned out not
to be what the Chinese migrants or many white Americans expected or
wanted, and a volatile mix of racism, economic jealousy, and cultural differ-
ence caused enormous political upheaval (pp. 35–39). Waves of nativist poli-
tics and organized terror ensued as white Americans resisted national
policies that favored free migration, enforced notions of white supremacy,
and demanded that the federal government settle “the Chinese Question”
(pp. 40–43). Until Congress solved the problem, white citizens would do the
job by displacing Chinese migrants from communities where they were not
* Clifford Scott Green Visiting Professor of Constitutional Law, Temple University’s
Beasley School of Law (Fall 2019); Professor of Law, American University, Washington College
of Law. My thanks to Sara Douki, Hermine Duplany, Andrew Lanham, Sarah McDonald, So-
phia Montgomery, and the staff of theMichigan Law Review for their fine editorial assistance.
1. Associate Professor of History, Princeton University.
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wanted. As they did so, they justified their actions through the higher law
tradition.2
What happened in Tacoma wasn’t a spontaneous or isolated occurrence.
To the contrary, it was part of a series of Chinese removals that were inten-
tional and systematic, organized not just by vigilantes acting alone but also
by leading figures within each community (p. 115). Local residents worked
with others in a network of loosely affiliated but intensely motivated social
groups that operated up and down the West Coast (p. 118). Before the group
of men executed a plan of expulsion in Tacoma, there were mass meetings
led by Mayor Jacob Weisbach to discuss what to do about the Chinese
(p. 122), who wore strange garb, adhered to odd customs, and could live on
very little.3 Local newspapers like the Tacoma Ledger whipped citizens into a
frenzy, warning of “this gigantic invasion of chinamen . . . captained by a few
American mandarins.”4
This method of social reordering through a brutal form of immigration
localism5 (today we would call it ethnic cleansing6) became portable, as one
city after another emulated the strategy. Indeed, Tacoma’s successful purge
of its Chinese residents led others to dub it “the Tacoma method” and por-
tray it as a “peaceful” solution (p. 124). Elsewhere, expulsions were preceded
by beatings, shootings, murders, or lynchings. But whether lives were lost or
not, social relationships were consistently disrupted, fear and anger were
plentiful, and almost always Chinese property was dismantled, destroyed, or
set ablaze as part of the ritual purification. Lew-Williams observes that from
2. See, e.g., George Dudley Lawson, The Tacoma Method, 7 OVERLANDMONTHLY 234,
235 (1886) (“An appeal to the higher law of self-preservation was determined upon, and the
Chinese were asked to ‘go.’ ”).
3. Let Him Preach to Empty Benches, DAILY LEDGER, Oct. 13, 1985, at 1. Not everyone
supported the planned expulsion. One of the few who spoke out against rising anti-Chinese
sentiment was Rev. W.D. McFarland, who found himself later denounced by the local newspa-
per as “a pro-Chinese fanatic of the most bigoted sort.” Id.
4. Jules Alexander Karlin, The Anti-Chinese Outbreak in Tacoma, 1885, 23 PAC. HIST.
REV. 271, 273 (1954).
5. More recent accounts of immigration localism have emphasized its progressive po-
tential, but for every Sheriff Sally Hernandez there is a Sheriff Joe Arpaio. See, e.g., Pratheepan
Gulasekaram et al., Essay, Anti-Sanctuary and Immigration Localism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 837
(2019). Power, once recognized, can’t be so easily cabined within formal, or even legal, limits.
6. Ethnic cleansing hasn’t been formally recognized as an independent crime under
international law but could be subsumed within “crimes against humanity.” U.N. Secretary-
General, Comm’n of Experts, Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant
to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), ¶¶ 72–74, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994). The
term emerged after the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s and has been defined as “rendering
an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given
groups from the area” or “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to re-
move by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or reli-
gious group from certain geographic areas.” Id. ¶¶ 129–30 (quoting U.N. Secretary-General,
Comm’n of Experts, Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Secu-
rity Council Resolution 780 (1992), ¶ 55, U.N. Doc. S/25274 (Feb. 10, 1993)).
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1885–1886, 168 different communities in America expelled the Chinese
(p. 1).
Lew-Williams’s magisterial account of the injustices perpetrated against
the Chinese is extremely generative on several fronts. The first is historical:
she seeks to correct a national narrative that often leaves out the horrors in-
stigated against the Chinese community while emphasizing emancipated
slaves and native populations as the primary victims of racial violence
(pp. 3–5). Her account of Chinese “resistance and flight in the face of white
violence” successfully complicates that story (p. 95) and, along the way,
deepens our understanding of American constitutional law’s development.
In Part I of this Review, I emphasize that anti-Chinese violence was extreme-
ly effective as a political tool. Perpetrators faced almost no legal repercus-
sions, and unlike for freed persons, racial violence didn’t lead to significant
legislation that benefited the Chinese. Judicial rulings were mixed: the
recognition of birthright citizenship was a high point, but rulings that en-
dorsed exclusion as a national policy and recycled theories of cultural in-
compatibility proved damaging. Along a second trajectory, The Chinese
Must Go raises troubling questions about America’s tradition of popular
sovereignty. In Part II, I assess this wave of anti-Chinese mobilization—from
aggressive boycotts to lynchings to armed expulsions—which were justified
by perpetrators and observers alike according to America’s higher law tradi-
tion. Finally, in Part III, I use the local expulsions of Chinese migrants as a
springboard to build a more complex portrait of inequality in America so
that we might remedy it more effectively. I do so by sketching a typology of
the different forms that inequality can take and explaining where racial
purges fit among them. What we discover when we study inequality this way
is how motivations, justifications, and consequences tend to cluster in new
patterns.
All three lines of inquiry are worth pursuing if we wish to make progress
on inequality today. We need to better understand our past, we need to fig-
ure out exactly how political and legal traditions have justified both cruelty
and liberation, and we need to adjust our existing toolbox for attacking the
various forms that inequality takes.
I. CHINESEREMOVALS INHISTORICALTIME
Lew-Williams’s remarkable work sheds light on how Americans recon-
sidered their fundamental values to justify mass expulsions. Those questions
are back on the national stage, after voters catapulted Donald Trump to the
Oval Office on the strength of rhetoric that demonized Hispanic migrants
and plans to block Muslim travelers and refugees from coming to the United
States.7 Exclusion was the preferred patois of Trump and his most ardent
supporters.
7. See, e.g., John Fritze, Trump Used Words Like ‘Invasion’ and ‘Killer’ to Discuss Immi-
grants at Rallies 500 Times: USA Today Analysis, USA TODAY (Aug. 8, 2019, 4:46 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2019/08/08/trump-immigrants-
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Of course, it’s not just Trump who’s engaged in this debate. Many
Americans have good-faith questions about the right amount of immigration
for American prosperity and security. Even so, roundups of undesirables, the
separation of loved ones, and population purges again occupy a major part
of this conversation. On such matters, the political and legal responses to the
so-called Chinese question during the nineteenth century yielded plentiful
material for both sides of today’s immigration debate to work with. Those
who favor unfettered migration and a cosmopolitan vision of community
lament the Chinese Restriction and Exclusion Acts,8 along with other tech-
niques historically deployed to deter unwanted populations. By contrast,
proponents of tough immigration restrictions and theories of cultural integ-
rity find these older ideas, strategies, and laws worth dusting off—tidied up if
possible—and reused.
More recently, in July 2019, University of Pennsylvania law professor
Amy Wax generated headlines at a convention on conservative nationalism
when she made the case for an immigration policy based on a theory of “cul-
tural-distance nationalism.”9 To Wax, who ridiculed the prevailing liberal-
pluralist ideology that a person from anywhere can easily assimilate to
American culture, it made perfect sense to limit migration from those coun-
tries whose traditions seem distant from those of the United States, even if it
meant “in effect . . . taking the position that our country will be better off
with more whites and fewer nonwhites.”10 Elsewhere, she has written: “[W]e
must ensure that bad habits from the Third World—lack of respect for law,
rhetoric-criticized-el-paso-dayton-shootings/1936742001/ [https://perma.cc/RH4E-DXPH];
Jessica Taylor, Trump Calls for ‘Total and Complete Shutdown of Muslims Entering’ U.S., NPR
(Dec. 7, 2015, 5:49 PM), https://www.npr.org/2015/12/07/458836388/trump-calls-for-total-
and-complete-shutdown-of-muslims-entering-u-s [https://perma.cc/HLG3-7J47] (reporting
Trump’s claim that Muslims have “great hatred” of America); Julia Carrie Wong, Trump Re-
ferred to Immigrant ‘Invasion’ in 2,000 Facebook Ads, Analysis Reveals, GUARDIAN (Aug. 5,
2019, 5:58 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/aug/05/trump-internet-facebook
-ads-racism-immigrant-invasion [https://perma.cc/K2E8-EQND].
8. This is sometimes popularly known as the “Chinese Exclusion Act,” but throughout
this Review I’ll go with the original name given to the law and reserve the 1888 law as the Chi-
nese Exclusion Act, as Lew-Williams has done.
9. Zack Beauchamp, Amy Wax, “National Conservatism,” and the Dark Dream of a
Whiter America, VOX (July 23, 2019, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019
/7/23/20679172/amy-wax-white-national-conservatism-yoram-hazony-racism [https://perma
.cc/9CMM-VN3X]; Osita Nwanevu, Conservative Nationalism Is Trumpism for Intellectuals,
NEW YORKER (July 21, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/conservative-
nationalism-is-trumpism-for-intellectuals [https://perma.cc/JPW5-NCGP]. Wax’s presenta-
tion was based on an earlier law review article. That essay is framed as one where she criticizes
the language used to talk about immigration, but it’s obvious that she is a proponent of cultur-
al-distance nationalism. She criticizes “creedal nationalism” for ignoring differences in immi-
grants’ ability to assimilate, defends cultural-distance nationalists for “wanting to limit the
influx of non-Western peoples,” praises Steve Bannon’s techniques for encouraging “self-
deportation” for achieving this second vision in America, and ridicules equality and human
rights as a progressive preoccupation with “niceness.” Amy L. Wax, Debating Immigration Re-
striction: The Case for Low and Slow, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 837, 851–62 (2018).
10. Beauchamp, supra note 9 (quoting Wax).
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rampant corruption and kleptocracy, despotism, weak markets, insecure
property rights, lassitude, lack of enterprise, tribalism, superstition, distrust,
rampant violence, misogyny, and unreason—are not allowed to infect and
undermine the First.”11 ToWax’s detractors, this approach smacked of older,
racist approaches to migrants and is at odds with the mid-1960s political set-
tlement that emphasizes civil rights, along with immigration and naturaliza-
tion policy that doesn’t presume cultural incompatibility between nonwhite
migrants and America’s civic tradition.
While Lew-Williams is not the first to do so,12 she powerfully illustrates
that arguments that migrants pose a threat of moral contagion and political
domination go way back. Specifically, she observes that “Chinese exclusion
and the modern American alien emerge[d]” at the same time (p. 236). Seen
in this light, Wax’s proposal to save America’s Western character through
demographic controls that differentiate among countries of origin, Samuel
Huntington’s vision of clashing civilizations,13 and even the Trump-Miller-
Bannon view of “American carnage” wrought by foreign powers14 all can be
traced to the ideological ferment of Chinese exclusion. That rhetoric has cer-
tainly been updated to incorporate Hispanic and Muslim migrants, but its
basic structure has largely survived intact—and so have the associated poli-
cies.
The curious thing about the Chinese is that, unlike the four million
slaves who suddenly gained citizenship rights after the Civil War and rose to
political power in a number of communities, they didn’t pose any serious
electoral threat before the repression began because they weren’t allowed to
vote (p. 228). Chinese people were already barred by federal law from be-
coming naturalized citizens, and even at the high point of Chinese migra-
tion, they still composed a fraction of the population. Yet as Lew-Williams
shows, their mere presence raised the specter of white citizens being con-
quered by outsiders (p. 6). The rhetoric of yellow domination mobilized
white people to take preemptive action to arrest further assimilation (pp. 6–
11. Wax, supra note 9, at 860.
12. See, e.g., ANDREW GYORY, CLOSING THE GATE: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE CHINESE
EXCLUSION ACT (1998); ERIKA LEE, AT AMERICA’S GATES: CHINESE IMMIGRATION DURING
THE EXCLUSION ERA, 1882–1943 (2003); JEAN PFAELZER, DRIVEN OUT: THE FORGOTTEN WAR
AGAINSTCHINESEAMERICANS (2007).
13. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF
WORLD ORDER (1996). In crasser and more alarmist form, these ideas have appeared in the
popular writings of conservative thinkers like Pat Buchanan and Ann Coulter. See, e.g.,
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, THE DEATH OF THE WEST: HOW DYING POPULATIONS AND
IMMIGRANT INVASIONS IMPERIL OUR COUNTRY AND CIVILIZATION (2002); ANN COULTER,
¡ADIOS, AMERICA!: THE LEFT’S PLAN TO TURN OUR COUNTRY INTO A THIRD WORLD
HELLHOLE (2015).
14. In President Trump’s First Inaugural Address, he recapitulated a number of eth-
nonationalist themes from his campaign: “We must protect our borders from the ravages of
other countries making our products, stealing our companies, and destroying our jobs.” Presi-
dent Donald J. Trump, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2017), http://whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/the-inaugural-address/ [http://perma.cc/ZD98-45S3].
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9), reverse the social and economic integration that had taken place, and
preempt the possibility of political equality—or foreign domination.15
In an early chapter, Lew-Williams analyzes a work of fiction titled Last
Days of the Republic, published in 1880.16 That book described the Chinese
as not only culturally unassimilable but also as a barely hidden threat to
American empire (p. 28). What begins as the description of the Chinese as a
“race alien alike to every sentiment and association of American life” eventu-
ally gives way to “treachery.”17 The mostly Chinese men who arrive on
America’s shores actually constitute a secret army, and when they eventually
gain citizenship followed by the right to vote, they quickly elect people of
Chinese ancestry to key civic positions (p. 29). And when Chinese armies fi-
nally land in South Carolina, that merely signals the last days of the republic,
for civilization had already crumbled from within.18
Last Days of the Republic wove together civic republicanism’s preoccu-
pation with political decay, white nationalist sentiment, and an emerging ob-
session with demographic control. Its portrayal of immigration captured
widely shared cultural stereotypes about Chinese people and conspiratorial
fears of the “alien crown” (p. 29). Yet such views stood in sharp contrast
from the perspective of American elites at the time. Those “cosmopolitan
elites,” portrayed as rapacious businessmen and servile politicians by anti-
Chinese forces, welcomed migration from China initially because they be-
lieved that a new source of foreign labor would actually lift up the status of
white workers and facilitate rapid empire building.19 This early national pol-
icy was reflected in treaties that protected the rights of the subjects of China
while they sojourned in America (pp. 28, 271 n.36).
Almost immediately, populist movements arose to defend the rights of
“white labor” against the “coolies” (or “semi-slaves”) and drive people of
Chinese ancestry from America’s shores (pp. 31–36). If freed blacks and in-
digenous nations represented populations that could be assimilated as full
citizens, the Chinese came to signify the perpetual noncitizen during this
same period—what Lew-Williams calls “the quintessential alien in Ameri-
ca.”20 California, Oregon, and Washington Territory spearheaded laws that
15. For more on white fears of becoming a minority in America, see Robert L. Tsai,
Specter of a White Minority, L.A. REV. BOOKS (Sept. 3, 2018), https://lareviewofbooks.org
/article/specter-of-a-white-minority/ [https://perma.cc/5HMK-QCDC].
16. P.W. DOONER, LASTDAYS OF THEREPUBLIC (1880).
17. Pp. 28–30 (quoting DOONER, supra note 16, at 27, 202).
18. P. 29. The use of fiction to disseminate notions of American community, including
visions of white sovereignty, is nothing new. See ROBERT L. TSAI, AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN
CONSTITUTIONS 236–37, 267–74 (2014).
19. Pp. 6, 11, 138–39. William Seward, Lincoln’s Secretary of State, exemplified this pol-
icy on free migration. Opening America to the Chinese, he thought, was necessary to prying
open China to “white labor” and American goods. In turn, “cheap” Chinese labor would be
helpful to development in Western states. Pp. 24–27.
20. P. 8; see also LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF
CONTEMPORARYMEMBERSHIP (2006).
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would “protect free White labor” and discourage Chinese migration (pp. 42–
43).
Many of these laws resulted from the efforts of the Workingmen’s Party,
which employed nationalistic, xenophobic, and racist rhetoric in its appeals
to white citizens (pp. 40–43). Local and regional media also played a major
role in casting people of Chinese ancestry as “invaders.” In a precursor to
Kris Kobach’s efforts to make life in America so inhospitable for migrants
that they leave voluntarily,21 a number of jurisdictions enacted laws prevent-
ing the Chinese from owning property, imposed unfair and burdensome
taxes, barred corporations from hiring people of Chinese ancestry, and re-
fused licenses to fish or operate businesses (p. 43).
National political parties were forced to heed this desire for exclusion.
Local expulsions and oppressive regulations eventually blossomed into a na-
tional policy of exclusion (pp. 43–45). This entire pattern of political action
“accelerated Chinese segregation in the U.S.,” stimulated migration to the
eastern parts of the country, and “hastened return migration to China,” Lew-
Williams writes (p. 8). The groundswell of anti-Chinese sentiment led to the
renegotiation of treaty obligations, which allowed the United States to regu-
late and even suspend Chinese migration (pp. 47–51), and eventually pushed
President Chester Arthur to sign the Chinese Restriction Act, which sus-
pended the entry of Chinese laborers for ten years—the first major national
restriction of immigration.22 Lew-Williams’s ability to tell a coherent narra-
tive while showing how local actors on both sides of the Chinese question
tried to navigate politics at all levels of government is a special achievement
of the book.
In a lively section analyzing the enforcement of the federal restriction
law in the Pacific Northwest, Lew-Williams recounts the adventures of a cus-
toms inspector named Arthur Blake who hunted for unauthorized Chinese
21. Prominent anti-immigration activist and former Kansas Secretary of State Kobach
has described a proposal of “attrition through enforcement.” Kris W. Kobach, Attrition
Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L
L. 155 (2008). “What if every illegal alien found it difficult to obtain employment in the United
States and the risks of enforcement (including the possibility of detention during removal
hearings) were to increase for all?” he asks. Id. at 157. To implement his vision, Kobach has
helped states and local jurisdictions enact a raft of novel laws that criminalize many aspects of
life for undocumented migrants. He has bragged that “[i]f we had a true nationwide policy of
self-deportation, I believe we would see our illegal alien population cut in half at a minimum
very quickly.” He says he doesn’t wish “to do it at gunpoint” but instead make it so they will
“go home on their own volition, under their own will, pick their own day, get their things in
order and leave. That’s a more humane way.” Jefferson Morley, The Man Behind Romney’s
“Self-Deportation” Plan, SALON (Feb. 23, 2012, 3:44 AM), https://www.salon.com/2012/02/22
/the_man_behind_romneys_self_deportation_dreams/ [https://perma.cc/PL6N-AKGR].
22. Pp. 48–51. President Hayes had vetoed a harsher law that would have suspended
Chinese migration broadly for twenty years and imposed passport and registration require-
ments on Chinese migrants. Pp. 46–48. What President Arthur later signed was a compromise.
Pp. 49–51. This law would later be extended for another ten years before it expired, and then
made permanent in 1902. PFAELZER, supra note 12, at 292, 335. The Chinese restriction laws
were not repealed until 1943. Id. at 346.
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migrants near Puget Sound (pp. 66–68). At that time, Port Townsend and
Seattle were key ports of entry. Deputy Blake had trouble distinguishing be-
tween authorized and unauthorized migrants, so he tried to institute an ad
hoc paperwork system that relied on the assistance of employers. He also
cultivated a network of informants, deputized private parties to make arrests,
and offered bounties (pp. 67–79). This vivid portrait of nascent bureaucracy-
building through enforcement practices is a valuable contribution to the lit-
erature.
Paradoxically, Lew-Williams thinks that “[f]ederal officials had encour-
aged a form of vigilantism” by enlisting the help of private citizens to enforce
the northern border (p. 88). She believes that the original strategy of Chinese
restriction failed because it gave the impression that the federal government
would do something to stem the flow of Chinese migrants but that the gov-
ernment never devoted sufficient resources to meet the challenge (pp. 87–
88). This not only heightened expectations of closed borders beyond what
was realistic, it also meant that when those expectations of demographic
control were dashed by shifts in the federal government’s priorities, anti-
immigration forces chomped at the bit to take the law into their own hands.
In fact, when thirty-seven Chinese workers showed up in Squak Valley
on September 7, 1885, a group of white and Native American men attacked
the camp, shooting into tents and leaving three dead and many others
wounded (p. 82). Acts of open terror like this seemed to galvanize local
communities who wished to settle the Chinese question definitively, but
those who recoiled from blatant violence searched for answers that fell short
of outright murder or beatings. Some anti-Chinese activists were content to
engage in boycotts and send petitions to elected officials, while others settled
upon a form of mobbing that involved some notice and restraint.23
According to Lew-Williams, white citizens toggled between open vio-
lence against migrants and more sophisticated strategies of expulsion in part
because unrestrained tactics brought unwanted attention from state and fed-
eral authorities and sometimes divided the white community, especially
along class lines (pp. 45–52). The Chinese occasionally fought back in the
streets, but most of the time they sought the aid of the legal profession and
well-placed businessmen (p. 94). In entreaties to politicians and diplomats,
they invoked their legal status as subjects of China—“most favored nation”—
to gain allies to fight back against white mobs, convince state or federal au-
thorities to intervene, or demand reparations (p. 94).
In Tacoma, for example, the expulsion plan began with mass meetings
as anti-Chinese forces tried to secure local support. Notices were subse-
quently posted throughout Chinatown demanding that the Chinese depart
by November 1, 1885 (pp. 96–97). This convinced many transient laborers to
23. Pp. 128–30. On “mobbing” as a feature of America’s constitutional tradition, see
PAUL A. GILJE, RIOTING IN AMERICA (1996); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 27 (2004); and David Grimsted, Rioting
in Its Jacksonian Setting, 77 AM. HIST. REV. 361 (1972).
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flee, but as Lew-Williams points out, Chinese merchants had more financial
investments to protect and believed that their greater social integration
would allow them to survive racial tensions and insulate them from any re-
prisals (pp. 96–98). They miscalculated. Community leaders chose to rapidly
escalate their efforts to uproot these more established members of society.
* * *
Although her focus is not on the courts, Lew-Williams’s book neverthe-
less enriches our appreciation of late nineteenth-century cases involving mi-
grants. One such case is Yick Wo v. Hopkins,24 in which the Supreme Court
vindicated the constitutional rights of a Chinese laundry operator. After
reading The Chinese Must Go, one has a better sense of the tumult faced by
judges who had to manage not only the priorities of the federal government
and the enduring interests of justice but also the realities of cultural discon-
tent. There are some notable bright spots when judges vindicated the consti-
tutional rights of migrants, but their willingness to endorse a vision of
permanent foreignness remains a major blemish—one that has cast a long
shadow over how American law treats nonwhite migrants.
What we know from the Yick Wo case itself is precious little: the city of
San Francisco adopted an ordinance that required laundromat operators to
obtain a permit if the building they would be operating from was not built of
brick or stone.25 While race neutral, the law had the effect of forcing every
Chinese laundromat operator to apply for a license because they happened
to work in wooden structures, and all of the Chinese applicants were sum-
marily denied.26 Meanwhile, operators of laundries in brick and stone build-
ings—who were mostly white—got a pass from the law and continued
business as usual.
Lee Yick challenged the refusal of his permit on equality grounds and
won. The ordinance was couched in terms of public health and cleverly did
not mention the Chinese at all. In many other situations, judges have been
confounded by such seemingly neutral laws. But in Yick Wo, the Supreme
Court expressed skepticism about whether the ordinance actually served the
needs of public order, implying that it might have been designed for nefari-
ous purposes. Even more surprising, the justices took the extra step of find-
ing that an unconstitutional motive—hostility to the person’s race and
national origin—infected local decisions in enforcing the law, and they in-
ferred animus from the lopsided enforcement of the law.
On top of that, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment, origi-
nally formulated primarily with the plight of freed persons in mind, extends
rights to foreign “persons” on American soil.27 That meant that while Amer-
24. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
25. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356.
26. Id. at 359–60.
27. Id. at 369.
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ican law might deny Chinese migrants certain kinds of rights like those
closely associated with U.S. citizenship (federal law at that time limited natu-
ralization to whites), they could still enjoy enforceable rights to life, liberty,
and property as noncitizens. These were all crucial developments in consti-
tutional law apart from recognizing that a treaty can create rights enforcea-
ble in federal court. But despite this ringing vindication of constitutional
rights, the ruling left much discretion in the hands of state and local authori-
ties, for there was no due process right to enforce, for instance, if state law
didn’t already recognize that someone had a property interest.
Lew-Williams mentions this case only in passing, but the widespread na-
ture of anti-Chinese hostility she documents throughout The Chinese Must
Go must have been such common knowledge that it influenced judges’
thinking about the law. In fact, while there is almost no direct discussion of
the xenophobic times in Yick Wo itself, the circuit judge who presided over
the dispute below did perceive the permit regulation as a means of ingen-
iously effectuating the banishment of the Chinese from the area. Circuit
Judge Sawyer wrote:
The effect of the execution of this ordinance in the manner indicated in the
record would seem to be necessarily to close up the many Chinese laun-
dries now existing, or compel their owners to pull down their present
buildings and reconstruct of brick or stone; or to drive them outside the
city and county of San Francisco, to the adjoining counties, beyond the
convenient reach of customers,—either of which results would be little
short of absolute confiscation of the large amount of property shown to be
now, and to have been for a long time, invested in these occupations.28
In fact, Sawyer said that the goal of local leaders to effectively expel the Chi-
nese by destroying their livelihood was well known.
That it does mean prohibition, as to the Chinese, it seems to us must be ap-
parent to every citizen of San Francisco who has been here long enough to
be familiar with the course of an active and aggressive branch of public
opinion and of public notorious events. Can a court be blind to what must
be necessarily known to every intelligent person in the state?29
He answered his own question by taking judicial notice of racial purges that
were happening contemporaneously.
Still, why the discrepancy between the lower court’s account, which is
compatible with the richer history uncovered by Lew-Williams, and the
more buttoned-down Supreme Court opinion? Perhaps the lower-key tone
taken in the higher court’s ruling was to avoid fanning the flames of anti-
Chinese sentiment. If so, the decisionmaking processes on the high court
somehow worked to understate the extent of racial violence, whereas the
28. In re Wo Lee, 26 F. 471, 474 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886). On the widespread use of zoning
laws to push Chinese restaurants out of business, see Gabriel J. Chin & John Ormonde, The
War Against Chinese Restaurants, 67 DUKE L.J. 681 (2018).
29. Wo Lee, 26 F. at 475.
April 2020] Racial Purges 1137
judges closer to the ground seemed more motivated to record those abuses.
Whatever the case, given the sophisticated method of legal expulsion at-
tempted there—not through vigilantism but through a process that’s infi-
nitely harder to detect because it relies on the discretion of local
bureaucrats—this seems like a missed opportunity by the Supreme Court to
fully document and brush back such forms of inequality.
There is another case that illustrates the effect of judges closer to the
ground, who might have had first- or second-hand knowledge of anti-
Chinese mobilization. Justice Stephen Field, who hailed from California,
handled a challenge to a law aimed at the Chinese while riding circuit.30 Ho
Ah Kow wound up in jail because he violated a San Francisco ordinance that
required at least 500 cubic feet of space for each person in a dwelling.31 The
migrants typically lived in close quarters to be able to save enough to send
money back to loved ones in China.32 The moment he was arrested, Ho Ah
Kow faced the prospect of losing all his hair, which he wore in a traditional
pigtail, because a separate law required the sheriff to shave the head of any-
one he detained.33
In an amazing ruling, Justice Field found this policy to be a form of tor-
ture constituting “a cruel and unusual punishment” as well as a denial of
equal protection of the laws.34 He appeared to see the policy as part of a wid-
er strategy of expelling the Chinese by humiliating them. “The ordinance
was intended only for the Chinese in San Francisco,” Field wrote.35 “This was
avowed by the supervisors on its passage, and was so understood by every-
one. The ordinance is known in the community as the ‘Queue Ordinance,’
being so designated from its purpose to reach the queues of the Chinese, and
it is not enforced against any other persons.”36
Toward the end of his opinion, Field explicitly mentioned the popular
tactic of racial purges. “We are aware of the general feeling—amounting to
positive hostility—prevailing in California against the Chinese, which would
prevent their further immigration hither, and expel from the state those al-
ready here,”37 Field wrote. Unfortunately, he also accepted that the Chinese
were unassimilable: “Their dissimilarity in physical characteristics, in lan-
guage, manners and religion, would seem, from past experience, to prevent
30. Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 20 Alb. L.J. 250 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879).
31. Id. at 250–51.
32. See pp. 21–24.
33. Ho Ah Kow, 20 Alb. L.J. at 251.
34. Id. at 252.
35. Id.
36. Id. Justice Field is even more explicit in a ruling three years later, saying that “there
now exist, and have existed for years, with the residents of the city and county of San Francis-
co, and its citizens and tax-payers, great antipathy and hatred toward the people of his race.” In
re Quong Woo, 13 F. 229, 230 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882) (striking down licensing scheme requiring
applicant to secure recommendation of twelve tax-paying citizens from the block where a
laundry was proposed).
37. Ho Ah Kow, 20 Alb. L.J. at 253.
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the possibility of assimilation with our people.”38 And he stated that re-
strictions on Chinese migration were probably justified: “thoughtful persons,
looking at the millions which crowd the opposite shores of the Pacific, and
the possibility at no distant day of their pouring over in vast hordes among
us, giving rise to fierce antagonisms of race, hope that some way may be de-
vised to prevent their further immigration.”39
Field then shifted gears by offering a strong nationalist vision that left no
power over immigration to state and local officials:
We feel the force and importance of these considerations; but the remedy
for the apprehended evil is to be sought from the general government,
where, except in certain special cases, all power over the subject lies. To that
government belong exclusively the treaty-making power, and the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, which includes intercourse as well
as traffic, and . . . the power to prescribe the conditions of immigration or
importation of persons.40
Field thought that further outrages could be avoided by the federal govern-
ment seizing total control of immigration enforcement. He continued:
The state in these particulars, with those exceptions, is powerless, and noth-
ing is gained by the attempted assertion of a control which can never be
admitted. . . . [N]othing can be accomplished in that direction by hostile
and spiteful legislation on the part of the State, or of its municipal bodies,
like the ordinance in question . . . .41
In this and other cases, federal judges sometimes interpreted federal law and
the U.S. Constitution to defend commercial and diplomatic interests in Chi-
nese migration (pp. 60–62).
Lew-Williams also does not spend much time analyzing the landmark
case Wong Kim Ark,42 beyond noting that the justices read the Fourteenth
Amendment to confer citizenship upon the children of Chinese migrants
born in the United States even though their parents were barred from natu-
ralization (p. 228). But it bears explaining how the history and rhetoric of
exclusion played a major role in that case. In deciding that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s birthright citizenship language encompassed the Chinese, the
Court cited two legislative discussions that referenced the children of Chi-
nese migrants.43 Both times, proponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as
well as the Fourteenth Amendment, which was modeled on that law,
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. This position would be crystalized as the “plenary power” doctrine, giving Con-
gress power to regulate immigration to the exclusion of the states. See Chae Chan Ping v. Unit-
ed States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
42. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
43. Id. at 697–98.
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acknowledged that under the provision “the child of an Asiatic is just as
much a citizen as the child of a European.”44
That Chinese migrants came up during these debates was crucial to con-
vincing judges to resist a tendency that had emerged to limit the interpreta-
tion of the Reconstruction Amendments to freed persons despite the
Amendments’ broad language. In other words, through a perverse stroke of
luck, Chinese migration had become so controversial that this vulnerable
population’s oppression percolated into constitutional debate. Drafters had a
chance to exclude people of Chinese ancestry or migrants generally from the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment but chose not to do so.
Representative Cowan of Pennsylvania objected twice to the proposed
language of birthright citizenship, the first time exclaiming, “The children of
German parents are citizens; but Germans are not Chinese.”45 He also allud-
ed to negative sentiment on the West Coast in a failed bid to get the Chinese
explicitly excluded from the language of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cowan
said,
I do not know how my honorable friend from California looks upon Chi-
nese, but I do know how some of his fellow-citizens regard them. I have no
doubt that now they are useful, and I have no doubt that within proper re-
straints, allowing that State and the other Pacific States to manage them as
they may see fit, they may be useful; but I would not tie their hands by the
Constitution of the United States so as to prevent them hereafter from deal-
ing with them as in their wisdom they see fit.46
Drawing on these exchanges, the justices explicitly subordinated laws re-
stricting Chinese migration to the Fourteenth Amendment rather than al-
lowing their racial views to shape judicial interpretation of the provision.
The crucial effect was that birthright citizenship could not be altered by
Congress.
For the dissenters, Justices Fuller and Harlan, laws meant to restrict
Chinese migration merely recognized the inalterably foreign nature of Chi-
nese people: even those born in America were nothing more than “aliens by
descent, but born on our soil.”47 In their view, “[t]he right of a nation to ex-
pel or deport foreigners who have not been naturalized or taken any steps
toward becoming citizens of a country, is as absolute and unqualified as the
44. Id.
45. Id. at 697. It wasn’t lost on the Court that a reading of the Fourteenth Amendment
that denied birthright citizenship to the Chinese would also harm the children of European
migrants. “To hold that the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution excludes from citizen-
ship the children, born in the United States, of citizens or subjects of other countries, would be
to deny citizenship to thousands of persons of English, Scotch, Irish, German or other Europe-
an parentage, who have always been considered and treated as citizens of the United States.”
Id. at 694.
46. Id. at 698.
47. Id. at 706.
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right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the county.”48 They then re-
cycled earlier language that justified treating the children of Chinese nonciti-
zens differently from other children on cultural grounds: they comprise “a
distinct race and religion, remaining strangers in the land, residing apart by
themselves, tenaciously adhering to the customs and usages of their own
country, unfamiliar with our institutions, and apparently incapable of assim-
ilating with our people, might endanger good order, and be injurious to the
public interests.”49 Proponents of cultural or racial nationalism had lost the
debate on that day, but the battle was just beginning.
II. EXPULSION AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
What civic leaders did in cleansing Tacoma of the Chinese was praised
by George Dudley Lawson in the Overland Monthly as “the Tacoma meth-
od.”50 He described it as nothing more than the age-old practice of “ex-
pel[ling] intruders or exil[ing] obnoxious members” of society, a somewhat
drastic move, but one that could be justified according to “the higher law of
self-preservation.”51 The power to remove undesirables was explicitly de-
fended on grounds of popular sovereignty and mutual self-defense. Lawson
wrote,
The Tacoma method is an application of the principle that all of the rights
of the people cannot be conditioned or defined in the statute books . . . and
that remedies and resorts must be left, in some degree, to be indicated by
emergencies. Every government on the face of the earth recognizes this
principle, and to all communities of the governed it is a vital one.52
Lawson’s statement was echoed throughout the American West, and this
persistent appeal to popular sovereignty to rationalize these purges reveals
an ugly strain in our political tradition—one that underscores just how mal-
leable this rhetoric has always been as well as the remarkably broad range of
ends that language can be used to promote. On these occasions, higher law
discourse was used to defend everything from bloodless racial purges to in-
justices such as threats, racist boycotts, beatings, shootings, destruction of
property, and murder.
For her part, Lew-Williams points out that the creative instigators of
these local displacements later felt vindicated by legal decisions that affirmed
the country’s power to completely exclude Chinese laborers, especially when
48. Id. at 726 (Fuller, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 731.
50. Lawson, supra note 2, at 234.
51. Id. at 234–35. Similarly, the Tacoma News called the racial purge a “glorious victo-
ry” and legitimate exercise of the “ ‘indefeasible right’ of a community ‘to purge itself of obnox-
ious elements.’ ” Karlin, supra note 4, at 280.
52. Lawson, supra note 2, at 238. At another point, he called what the white residents of
Tacoma did to the Chinese as “the local application of Abraham Lincoln’s principle of a gov-
ernment ‘of the people, by the people, and for the people.’ ” Id. at 239.
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those decisions relied on rationales grounded in mutual self-defense and cul-
tural incompatibility. Even though the Supreme Court ultimately denied
them a formal role in immigration enforcement,53 they believed that they
had simply been doing at the grassroots level what the Court finally said was
within the power of Congress to accomplish more comprehensively.
But the fact of the matter was that these citizens never felt the need to
ask for permission before they acted. Their appeal to natural law was some-
times defended on a theory of political breakdown, or as a response to re-
peated grievances unheard, or as a kind of interstitial act neither authorized
nor explicitly permitted by the law (Chapter Four). These purgers were not
always consistent in their arguments, but they generally felt that the scale of
the problem was enormous, that there were exigencies involved, and that
when people assembled as they did, they were authorized to supersede any
treaty or ordinary law that stood in the way. Mobilized thus, the community
was then capable of carrying out harsh but necessary measures.
For many white residents, that extralegal form of self-help was explicitly
linked to demographic control to preserve white supremacy. Tacoma’s Chi-
nese population had swelled to 800 or so,54 and now its presence was per-
ceived to be damaging cultural mores and discouraging economic
investment in the city. So the people would do what state and national lead-
ers refused to do—in that sense, this could be understood as an instance of
exploiting federalism for the sake of preserving a racist vision of social order.
“[T]he race is an undesirable element, and should not be allowed to obtain a
foothold on our soil,” Lawson insisted, praising Oregon laws that barred
Chinese people from owning property in the state and recognized the Chi-
nese as “a transitory race.”55 But Washington’s territorial laws did not recog-
nize this same difference in the races, and that gave rise to the need for self-
help by whites. Lawson thought removal was justified because the Chinese
had “formed a colony of leeches” and become “a menace to public health
and safety.”56 He claimed that once Tacoma became “one-tenth Chinese,”
“conditions were becoming antagonistic to white occupation.”57 Indeed, he
insisted that “at least nine-tenths of the white residents sympathized entirely
with the movement to make it a white man’s town of peace and plenty.”58
Community leaders had help mobilizing anti-Chinese sentiment. Along
these lines, Lew-Williams shows that the Knights of Labor played a signifi-
cant role in the purges (pp. 118–19). Not all union figures were committed
to driving the Chinese out of the country, but key leaders did see a benefit to
organizing white workers around the issue (p. 118). Labor’s influence
ratcheted up the sense of economic competition and denied migrants sup-
53. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
54. Lawson, supra note 2, at 234.
55. Id. at 238.
56. Id. at 235.
57. Id. at 234.
58. Id.
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port from working-class white people. In fact, a number of law enforcement
figures belonged to the union, and when it came time for the purge of Taco-
ma, they either actively participated in the removal or refused to come to the
aid of the Chinese at their most desperate hour (pp. 121–23).
As Lew-Williams explains, those who carried out Chinese expulsions felt
they were acting nonviolently (pp. 121–24), and this played a role in the
popularity of the method. Lawson himself argued that “Tacoma is to be con-
gratulated” because its residents had shown supreme restraint; their actions
“escaped even the appearance of riot or violence.”59 At least their efforts fell
short of the talk of extermination that had started to permeate mass meet-
ings, and they involved no lynchings or fire bombings.60
Leaders of the purge gave Tacoma’s Chinese residents advance notice,
demanding that they go (pp. 96–97). Within two weeks of notices posted
everywhere, Chinatown had emptied by half.61 But that wasn’t good enough,
according to the local paper. “If any are allowed to remain, others will
come,” warned the Tacoma Ledger. Then the metaphor of ritual purification:
“There must be a clean sweep and a thorough application of disinfectant af-
ter the sweeping is done” (p. 123).
That final removal of the remaining fifty to one hundred or so migrants,
described as “intruders” and “[l]ingering Mongols” (p. 123), was effectuated
in a manner Lawson defended as consistent with “the recognition and pro-
tection of all human rights that could . . . be demanded for any class of men,
in its natural and necessary removal from a community where it had ceased
to be useful and had become dangerous, or let us say, only inconvenient.”62
He pointed to the fact that city and county “peace officers” were involved the
entire time and that the migrants were told they had to leave but would not
be hurt.63 Indeed, as Lew-Williams points out, during the purge the mayor,
who was supervising the events, turned and asked the sheriff whether the
59. Id. at 238; see also 1 HERBERT HUNT, TACOMA: ITS HISTORY AND ITS BUILDERS 373
(1916) (“It was a mob, but an orderly mob as mobs go.”).
60. Jean Pfaelzer documents many of the attacks that occurred against the Chinese in
California. White miners carried out “ruthless evictions” in places like El Dorado County,
Placer County, and Shasta County. Throughout the spring and summer of 1852, white miners
attacked the camps of Chinese miners, barred wagons containing their equipment from enter-
ing, and set fire to their tents and tools. PFAELZER, supra note 12, at 10–16. In 1858–1859, a
race war began when 200 armed white men on horseback rode from camp to camp, ordering
the Chinese to leave the area and give up any claims. A local sheriff tried to help the Chinese
resist these racial purges by arresting vigilantes, but his men were outnumbered and he had to
telegram for help from the governor: “An armed body of men, 300 strong and increasing, is
organized for the purpose of driving the Mongolians out, in defiance of the law and its offic-
ers,” Shasta County Sheriff Clay Stockton wrote. Id. at 13–16. These same techniques were
used against Latin Americans and Native Americans who also came to mine the land. Id. at 17–
24. On the life of Chinese miners, see David V. DuFault, The Chinese in the Mining Camps of
California: 1848-1870, 41 HIST. SOC’Y S. CAL. Q. 155 (1959).
61. Lawson, supra note 2, at 235.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 236.
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armed white citizens were a “mob” (p. 123). The sheriff replied that the men
carrying out the purge were acting within the law, since they were carrying
out the racial purge in an orderly fashion: “Their men [are] orderly and [do]
not demand any interference” (p. 123).
After “the final exodus” was accomplished, Lawson predicted that “the
removal of the little yellow man, will go far to immortalize the pleasant city
at the head of Puget Sound.”64 As horrific as Lawson’s defense of a racial
purge sounds now, it is apparent that his view was widely shared at the time.
White people who carried out the mass removals of Chinese people believed
that they were in the right and that they were behaving within the bounds of
higher law—even when doing so conflicted with federal law or international
obligations. They met publicly, deliberated openly, gave notice before apply-
ing force, sometimes offered provisions to those they were displacing, and
refrained from what they felt to be unnecessary violence.
Those responsible for leading the Chinese purges also meant to send a
message to business leaders, elected officials, and judges. Partway through
her book, Lew-Williams clarifies that expulsion was distinctively political
and communicative: those who carried out the practice believed they were
“broadcast[ing]” demands for legal change (pp. 116, 133). Her definition of
expulsion thus emphasizes its dialogic role as “a form of violent racial poli-
tics, that is, group violence intended to make a national political statement
but meted out against a local racial minority” (p. 116).
And more than one community wanted to send a message. When the
purges made their way to Seattle, federal troops had to be called out twice
(pp. 106–07). Just before the first Seattle purge took place, anti-Chinese ac-
tivists met with leading Chinese merchant-contractors to try to get them to
remove themselves. Businessmen who employed Chinese laborers began to
send them away (p. 105). But this concession was not enough to arrest the
logic or momentum of expulsion.
Lew-Williams tells this terrifying chapter of our nation’s history with
brutal honesty, from many perspectives at once, and she doesn’t give anyone
a free pass. In an especially effective part of the book, she presents a first-
hand account of the Chinese expulsions from the point of view of white citi-
zens who were sympathetic to their suffering (Chapter Five). These figures
included Washington Territorial Governor Watson C. Squire and his wife,
Ida Squire, and Alexander Farquharson, owner of a barrel-manufacturing
business, who stood his ground and stopped vigilantes from seizing his Chi-
nese workers (pp. 139, 151–52). Each of these figures could have been stal-
wart allies, and some even came to the aid of migrants in need, but most
emerged from these racial conflicts firmly convinced that only a drastic solu-
tion could restore domestic tranquility.
Governor Squire, a transplant from the Northeast, initially believed that
people of Chinese ancestry faced a lot of prejudice (p. 139). But after living
through the purges of Seattle, he came to accept “the intense feeling of an-
64. Id. at 234.
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tagonism that is seated in the breasts of the great body of our labouring peo-
ple in reference to the Chinese” (p. 143). Barely a month after the events in
Tacoma, Squire asked Washington’s Territorial Assembly to petition Con-
gress to end all Chinese migration, saying that the continued presence of the
Chinese spelled the end of “Christian civilization” (p. 165).
For her part, Ida Squire found the thought of hundreds of Chinese peo-
ple “crowded on the wharf—trembling and crying” to be “cruel” (p. 146).
Experiencing the purges, however, shook her to the core. Fear of the
“roughs”—white vigilantes who would not stop at the color line, but would
also attack white allies of the Chinese—led her to want the migrants gone
even though they had made her life more comfortable (p. 147). This moved
her toward tolerating voluntary repatriation, with the charity of white people
willing to help fund the cost of travel to get Chinese people out of town
(pp. 147–48).
Farquharson, who owned a plant in Puyallup, told his Chinese workers
to arm themselves and even went face-to-face with vigilantes who threatened
to burn his factory to the ground (pp. 148–52). His fellow citizens hanged
him in effigy (p. 150). Farquharson never turned his Chinese employees over
to the purge committees, but the threats and disruptions to his business
eventually took a toll. He stopped hiring people of Chinese ancestry and told
those on his payroll to move on. As Lew-Williams tells us, “over the winter
of 1885–1886, Farquharson was among scores of employers who discharged
thousands of Chinese workers from the mines, farms, factories, and railroads
of the U.S. West” (p. 152).
Some white allies did come to the aid of Chinese migrants, but they
faced social ostracism and violence for being “China lover[s]” and “white
Chinamen.”65 In the face of such repercussions for defending racial equality
and opposing violence, many eventually succumbed to the logic of expulsion
on a grander scale, as long as they were not the ones who had to carry it out.
Lew-Williams’s portrayal of these racial purges complicates our
knowledge of the American political tradition. A great deal of constitutional
law scholarship is narrowly (perhaps even selectively) focused on egalitarian
episodes of popular lawmaking: the black civil rights movement, women’s
suffrage, Occupy Wall Street, Black Lives Matter.66 But once you digest the
breadth of local Chinese removals and the rhetoric that surrounded them,
65. In Whatcom County, Washington, white people who refused to participate in the
purges were derided as “white Chinamen.” Kie Relyea, Remembering Washington’s Chinese
Expulsion 125 Years Later, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 7, 2010, 9:46 AM), https://www.seattle
times.com/seattle-news/remembering-washingtons-chinese-expulsion-125-years-later [https://
perma.cc/QD9H-Q2DB]; see also p. 151 (reporting that Farquharson was charged with being
“a China lover”).
66. Mostly genial accounts of popular sovereignty in America include BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991), and KRAMER, supra note 23. But see
MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE (2015); Linda
Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash,
120 YALE L.J. 2028 (2011).
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you cannot help but see our tradition more capaciously: popular sovereignty
has also been used to license massive acts of inhumanity and inequality. It is
a more accurate picture, even though it shines the light on some darker cor-
ners of popular constitutionalism.
First, the scenes of Chinese expulsions highlight once again the destabi-
lizing nature of popular sovereignty. Not only is it indeterminate who can
legitimately speak for the people, but it is also a deeply contested question
when the people may speak. While the script for popular lawbreaking is al-
ways the same—significant unaddressed grievances justify extreme collective
measures—the templates for direct action, which are composed of not just
the basic script but also the different reasons and ends, can be very different.
The more portable a particular template for popular action, the more easily
anyone with a grievance can—by associating with like-minded individuals—
claim the authority to act in the higher law tradition. The same formula that
justified a revolutionary break from British rule can also be recycled, as it
was here, on a more local level, for an even more discrete set of complaints.
Second, there is an intrinsic connection between delegitimizing ordinary
law and generating a license for violence. The first is done to create space for
the second. Relatedly, there is a temptation to overlook the violence if it is
narrow in scope or not as bad as someone else’s past violent act. These fine
lines between episodes of violence are all drawn on the wrong side of the law.
To be sure, not every act of lawbreaking is violent. Strikes, boycotts, and civil
disobedience geared toward legal transformation all try to thread the needle.
But the rhetoric of popular sovereignty, once engaged, tends to create ever-
greater room for forceful action.
Not everyone is willing or able to hold the line. Abolitionist John Brown
offers a cautionary tale. Brown started out cautiously, engaging in activities
on behalf of the Underground Railroad, but once he began justifying acts of
violence according to the higher law tradition, he found it harder and harder
to draw lines that couldn’t later be reset to accommodate more severe acts of
force.67 Fighting back against slave catchers based on a natural law theory of
self-defense led to affirmative acts of slave stealing, whether the enslaved
person was ready for liberation or not. Eventually, his attack on Harper’s
Ferry seemed as defensible as anything else he did before, since there were
many individuals and institutions that played some role in the morally bank-
rupt practice of slavery. If slavery was really best understood as a “war of one
portion of [the country’s] citizens upon another,” then self-defense could
justify nearly anything.68
Third, popular sovereignty can sometimes be used not to create perma-
nent institutions, as the framers of new constitutions do, but instead to justi-
fy ad hoc organizations—adjuncts to law enforcement, deliberative
conventions as alternatives to city or county government—and then to im-
bue them with a gloss of legitimacy. These extralegal institutions may exist
67. See Robert L. Tsai, John Brown’s Constitution, 51 B.C. L. REV. 151, 176 (2010).
68. TSAI, supra note 18, at 92, 108–17.
1146 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 118:1127
only for a short time, justified by crisis-like language. Alternatively, they
could ripen into other kinds of vigilante committees or roving militias, seize
control of formal offices with the capacity to do great harm, and even splin-
ter into more lasting forms of antiegalitarian activity.69
All three of these concerns are amply demonstrated by proponents of
racial purges. In Tacoma, windows were shattered, doors were broken down,
and Chinese residents who refused to comply were chased down and seized.
Those who were displaced recall being prodded by clubs and poles and driv-
en through the streets “like so many hogs” (p. 101). In Seattle, where racial
purges spread next, the pregnant wife of a Chinese businessman was dragged
down the stairs of her home and into the streets. She ended up losing her
child due to the trauma (p. 107). And yet even when Chinese purges were
more violent than what occurred in Tacoma, perpetrators still felt they were
acting nonviolently, exemplifying civic virtue.70
Ad hoc gatherings of agitators seeking support for collective action
against migrants tried to invoke the glorious tradition of the people meeting
out of doors. They met in “conventions” and put together “committees”
(pp. 121–23, 134–35). But it could be hard to tell the difference between vir-
tuous civic gatherings and clandestine vigilante groups that could hardly be
said to represent the broad judgment of an entire community. And many of
the anti-Chinese boycotts involved threats to life and limb (p. 129).
Perhaps the most troubling thing about Lew-Williams’s account is that
the Chinese purges largely worked. She observes that out-migration spiked,
as the Chinese population in America dropped by 42,437 between 1882 and
1900 (p. 223). California alone experienced a net loss of 30,000 people of
Chinese ancestry during the height of the anti-Chinese movement (p. 223).
Worse, with a few exceptions, most perpetrators got away with it (pp. 132–
33). This gave the popular defense of the method more credence than it de-
served. Federal troops intervened in Seattle before a complete purge could be
carried out, and there were a few cases where resistance by the Chinese mo-
mentarily repelled an attack (p. 106). Occasionally, Chinese people fought
back against racist boycotts by arming themselves, engaging in strikes and
work slowdowns, and refusing to patronize white businesses involved in
such activity.71
69. Along these lines, check out the so-called “Constitutional Sheriffs Movement,”
which also draws on the tradition of popular sovereignty and insists that a county sheriff is the
highest law enforcement officer in that jurisdiction—and has the power to resist state and fed-
eral officers. Two prominent members of this right-wing grassroots movement are Joe Arpaio
and David A. Clarke, Jr. See Robert L. Tsai, The Troubling Sheriffs’ Movement that Joe Arpaio
Supports, POLITICO (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/01/joe-
arpaio-pardon-sheriffs-movement-215566 [https://perma.cc/VL27-A3GH]. During his tenure,
Arpaio, an elected official, took it upon himself to begin enforcing federal immigration laws
without permission. He was at war with the federal government, immigrants’ rights groups,
and even his own county board of commissioners, which could not restrain him.
70. See pp. 124–25.
71. PFAELZER, supra note 12, at 39, 176, 183, 234, 260, 265, 267, 285.
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But there was never much by way of legal accountability, beyond negoti-
ated reparations for a handful of racial attacks. In the aftermath of Tacoma’s
expulsion, a U.S. attorney eventually indicted twenty-seven individuals for
insurrection and conspiracy to deprive Chinese people of equal protection of
the laws.72 The defendants were those who played leadership roles, including
the mayor, sheriff, and members of the chamber of commerce.73 At trial,
they defended themselves by arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment could
not reach purely private action.74 Somewhat shockingly, the defendants also
relied on the Dred Scott decision to argue that some classes of human be-
ings—in this case, the Chinese—should be deemed unprotected by the Con-
stitution since they could not become citizens.75 Ultimately, the charges were
dismissed and the defendants returned home to a hero’s welcome.76 In Los
Angeles, where seventeen Chinese people were brutally killed by a mob of
500 people, convictions were overturned and charges were never refiled.77
Unfortunately, there was no wave of political sympathy for Chinese mi-
grants that translated into citizenship or enhanced civil rights for them.
Here, a comparative approach could deepen the bite of Lew-Williams’s
point. Unlike racial violence against emancipated slaves, which led to the
passage of the Reconstruction Amendments and the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871,78 anti-Chinese violence rallied elites to the side of white supremacy,
while leaving Chinese people who remained in America in a state of legal
purgatory—a problem for later generations to solve (Chapter Six).
Local agitators got what they wanted: expulsion on a grander scale. As
Lew-Williams argues, while the wave of anti-Chinese violence was deplored
by many, it had the intended effect of pushing national officials to side with
their white constituents and close the door completely to Chinese migration
(pp. 188–90). The logic was devastatingly simple: it was safer for everyone
involved if they just got rid of them. “These little mobs rise, but they can not
exterminate them, and we can not prevent it,” declared Democratic senator
John Tyler Morgan of Alabama.79 “All we can do is to keep them out of this
country.”80 When diplomatic efforts to renegotiate treaty terms with China
failed, the United States moved unilaterally in 1888 to expand the terms of
72. Id. at 223–24.
73. Id. at 224–25.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 226–27.
76. Id. at 228–29.
77. Id. at 47–53.
78. Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights—Will
the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1985); Arturo Peña Miran-
da, “Where There Is a Right (Against Excessive Force), There Is Also a Remedy”: Redress for Po-
lice Violence Under the Equal Protection Clause, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1678, 1701–11 (2018);
Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional Tort:Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 NW. U. L.
REV. 277, 279–80 (1965).
79. 19 CONG. REC. 8570 (1888) (statement of Sen. Morgan).
80. Id.
1148 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 118:1127
the 1882 Restriction Act, not only barring Chinese migrants, but also declar-
ing void 30,000 return certificates issued to Chinese people who once lived in
the United States but who had temporarily left the country (pp. 185–93).
When the law went into effect, 600 Chinese travelers were left stranded on
the high seas (p. 192).
In signing the Chinese Exclusion Act, President Cleveland parroted the
rhetoric of anti-Chinese forces across the country, declaring “[t]he experi-
ment of blending the social habits and mutual race idiosyncracies of the
Chinese laboring classes with those of the great body of the people of the
United States . . . to be in every sense unwise, impolitic, and injurious to both
nations.”81 The harsh logic of expulsion, rooted in assertions of cultural in-
compatibility and driven through a ferocious popular movement, had now
truly gone national.
III. TOWARD ATYPOLOGY OF INEQUALITY
At the start of her study, Lew-Williams tantalizingly suggests that our
way of thinking about racial violence is stunted because we haven’t ade-
quately grappled with Chinese removals (pp. 1–3). But how, exactly? And to
what end, beyond understanding the past? Since it is not exactly fair to de-
mand more from a historian, the rest of us must take the opportunity to
wring additional political and legal significance from her careful work if we
wish to capitalize upon this knowledge for the pursuit of justice. To do that,
we shall have to put the anti-Chinese racial purges that occurred in the con-
text of other forms of inequality. When we do so, we learn that different
types of inequality create new arrangements or “clusters” of motivations, ac-
tions, and harms.
Much thinking about inequality in America is predicated upon assump-
tions of uniqueness, that each social group’s struggle has been special and
must be respected.82 The problem is that this isn’t accurate. The victims of
injustice may be different, but the objectives of perpetrators, the nature of
their collective actions, and the damage inflicted upon minority populations
can be similar. Worse, the urge to preserve a distinctive memory can get in
the way of obtaining justice. Even if we take white supremacy as a major fea-
ture of America’s story, the methods of maintaining racial dominance have
crossed group lines. They have also morphed over time. As Lew-Williams
notes, for instance, the politics of exclusion deployed against the Chinese
was originally engaged against paupers and drunks, who were perceived to
be mostly Irish (pp. 43, 49). And after the Civil War, communities that expe-
rienced an influx of freed persons—like Tulsa, Oklahoma, whose Greenwood
81. 19 CONG. REC. 9052 (1888) (message from President Grover Cleveland); see also
p. 188.
82. See, e.g., JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME (1963); RONALD TAKAKI,
STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS (rev. ed. 1998);
CORNELWEST, RACEMATTERS (1993).
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section was known as “Black Wall Street”83—also sometimes experienced ra-
cial purges. In the same vein, the strategy of imposing unequal taxes to scare
away the Chinese was a technique also used to justify the deportation of
Chileans and Mexicans.84
As I have argued elsewhere,85 fear of comparing experiences can prevent
us from dealing with the full extent of human suffering and inequality. But
we have to do it the right way: not to determine some magical threshold be-
low which suffering is simply not seen or remediable; but rather to see the
full complexity of inequality in America. We can’t just pit one group against
another. We must dare to identify commonalities among oppressive practic-
es and the lasting interplay between social harms.
After all, it’s impossible to move forward unless we have a good sense of
what went wrong. And to operationalize our sense of how we’ve gone wrong
in the past, we’ll have to adjust our legal and historical understanding of ine-
quality in America. In that light, The Chinese Must Go reveals that majoritar-
ian processes and well-placed supporters repeatedly failed vulnerable
immigrants, even those who were lawfully present and committed no crimes.
And yet our constitutional doctrines are stunted by an obsession with indi-
vidualized mistreatment rather than systematic injuries—even the dream of
a post-racial society can blind us to the intergenerational effects of unequal
policies.
Simplistic, cumbersome, or parsimonious notions of equality must be
reconsidered or set aside. That’s because without a good feel for the subtle-
ties of inequality, legal formulas are uncertain methods for facilitating reme-
dies. In the absence of a richer vision of inequality, the best we could hope
for is that decisionmakers go through the motions and occasionally hit upon
an outcome that does some good. To render meaningful justice, we must
find our way toward a more comprehensive catalogue of the forms of ine-
quality, the harms associated with each historical variety, the reasons for do-
ing something about them, and the remedies that might be appropriate.
In my view, it makes sense to treat expulsions as a separate form of ine-
quality. This is a different approach to understanding inequality than that of
many philosophers. For instance, T.M. Scanlon has offered six different rea-
sons one might give for objecting to inequality.86 He says, for example, that
83. “The Greenwood Massacre,” sometimes known as “the Tulsa Riot of 1921,” was
sparked by a white teenage girl’s accusation that a black man had tried to sexually assault her in
an elevator; the charge was later dropped. In the meantime, white mobs demanded that the
accused, then under arrest, be delivered up for rough justice. White mobs rampaged through
the black section of town, shooting and looting. It led to hundreds dead, the arrest of 6,000
black citizens, and thousands of homes and businesses burned to the ground. See ALFRED L.
BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING THEDREAMLAND: THETULSARIOT OF 1921 (2002).
84. PFAELZER, supra note 12, at 31.
85. ROBERT L. TSAI, PRACTICAL EQUALITY: FORGING JUSTICE IN A DIVIDED NATION
101–05 (2019).
86. T.M. SCANLON, WHYDOES INEQUALITYMATTER? (2018). Scanlon says there are six
kind of objections to inequality: (1) it creates a humiliating difference in status; (2) it gives the
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providing public services differently to different people for no good reason
would be a denial of equal concern and that this is a different sort of objec-
tion to inequality than a complaint that something fosters status inequality
or denies procedural fairness.87
My concern here is not to supplant other ways of thinking about ine-
quality but instead to supplement the most useful approaches by grounding
them in historical complexity and improving our capacity to remedy a
broader range of injustices. At the same time, we’ll need to theorize across
moments and experiences so we can recognize commonalities in terms of
intentions, consequences, harms, and solutions.
We should start by building a typology of inequalities. Here’s a sketch:
1. Slavery
2. Physical Violence (murder, assault, battery, rape)
3. Expulsion
4. Detention
5. Separation
6. Symbols of Hatred or Hierarchy
7. Denial of Civil Rights or Fundamental Rights (i.e., voting,
speech, migration, etc.)
8. Differential Treatment as to Other Social Goods
9. Destruction of Property and Wealth Disparities
10. Impairment of Economic Opportunity
What do we learn when we treat inequality as a series of distinctive
forms instead of merely reasons for concern? First, we start to see that the
attributes of a particular form of inequality will share a family resemblance,
even if they are applied to new groups and fresh circumstances. For instance,
the stimulation of hierarchy and hatred, creation of a homogeneous com-
munity, social dislocation and geographic dispersal of undesirables, rise of a
nomadic population, total shutdown of local economic opportunities to the
expelled, and deterrence of future in-migration are all consequences shared
by racial purges. Indeed, we can talk about designed rootlessness as a feature,
since the idea was to keep Chinese migrants perpetually on the move in the
hope they would eventually decide to wander back to their country of origin.
In other words, local expulsion hopefully encouraged out-migration by re-
rich unjustifiable power over those who are not wealthy; (3) it undermines equality of econom-
ic opportunity; (4) it undermines the fairness of political institutions; (5) it violates the notion
of equal concern in distributing benefits; and (6) it arises from economic institutions that are
themselves unfair. Id. at 8–9. Other philosophers emphasize a single principle of “basic equali-
ty,” along with some secondary concepts. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, ONE ANOTHER’S
EQUALS (2017).
87. SCANLON, supra note 86, at 5–7.
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ducing economic opportunities and multiplying the kinds of social pain ex-
perienced by members of this group.
This set up a self-fulfilling prophesy: already described by anti-
immigration forces as outsiders and risks of becoming public charges, Chi-
nese people would then be forced to become just like vagrants, a despised
category of people in America that traditionally enjoyed fewer rights than
full citizens. After all, the original Articles of Confederation explicitly ex-
cluded “paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives” from the full privileges and im-
munities that “free citizens” enjoyed.88 Widespread racial purges
transformed a new set of migrants—the Chinese—into more historically fa-
miliar legal outcasts. And since these other groups did not enjoy the same
rights to travel freely within the United States, constructing the Chinese in
these terms made it easier to expose them to different and harsher treatment
than other immigrants.
Similarly, this approach helps us to identify a set of related harms flow-
ing from a particular form of inequality. Each time a racial purge was carried
out, Chinese people experienced a similar set of injuries: a disruption in their
social relationships, forced homelessness, psychological and perhaps physical
injuries stemming from experiencing political terror, vulnerability to further
downstream abuse, the loss of economic investments and future opportuni-
ties—just to name a few.
Second, reasons for objecting to a particular kind of inequality can clus-
ter in particular, historically salient ways. We might object to racial expul-
sions for reasons we might not give for other forms of inequality. Using
Scanlon’s terminology as a springboard, it is possible to say that the expul-
sion of Chinese migrants expressed animus because it fostered a humiliating
difference in status compared with other immigrants; that the threat of racial
purges and racist boycotts denied them equality of economic opportunities;
that these displacements, when led by state actors like elected officials and
law enforcement officers, corroded the fairness of political institutions
meant to serve and protect everyone; and finally, that the state failed to treat
the Chinese with equal concern because it failed to protect their rights to se-
curity and property guaranteed by relevant law.
Third, the approach confirms that racial violence is neither irrational
nor unpredictable. Even when it’s believed to be solved, it can reoccur, and
when it does, that violence follows certain repeatable forms. To talk of racial
violence as if it were some kind of collective hysteria wrongly absolves sub-
jects of agency and moral responsibility, and it underplays the crucial role
that tradition and politics play in driving racial terror. In reality, perpetrators
behave deliberately, recycling forms of inequality that served their ends in
the past and adjusting strategies as necessary. In this respect, it isn’t just “the
88. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 1. This exception was not
carried over in the U.S. Constitution, and this fact was remarked upon by some—including
John Bingham, principal drafter of the Fourteenth Amendment—as an indicator of a more
expansive belief in equality for all. See CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (1859).
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Tacoma Method” that was portable—all forms of inequality provide tem-
plates for future action. This tells us something else: our reasons and strate-
gies for opposing inequality will have to be just as adaptable.
We can now say a little more about purges as a strategy for fostering in-
equality. Expulsions have frequently been used to serve white supremacy, but
they needn’t be tethered to such an objective. In the years before immigra-
tion policy became a national concern, New York and Massachusetts round-
ed up and deported foreign paupers.89 Closer to our own time, many
municipalities have used zoning laws to force people with intellectual disa-
bilities to live outside of populated downtown areas, raising similar ques-
tions of group displacement.90 Also, banishment was used to rid a
community of interracial couples and drunks, while zoning techniques have
been deployed to remove sex offenders and homeless people out of sight, out
of mind.91
Expulsions can be extralegal measures, as they were in the case of the
Chinese when they were deprived of civil rights guaranteed under treaties,
federal law, and even state law. But expulsions can also be legally authorized,
as they were once it became a national policy to keep out and hunt for unau-
thorized Chinese migrants, or when indigenous tribes were systematically
deprived of sovereignty and their members forcibly relocated to reserva-
tions.92 Legalized expulsions become almost something else entirely. Once
codified and imbued with formal legitimacy, purges become more systematic
and efficient. The logic of exclusion can become unassailable—as we all be-
come accustomed to regular expulsions as a way of life. Its funding becomes
more stable, bureaucracies are built to carry out the removals of the unwant-
ed, an entire segment of society becomes economically and emotionally in-
89. HIDETAKA HIROTA, EXPELLING THE POOR: ATLANTIC SEABOARD STATES AND THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY ORIGINS OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 2–3 (2017). There was
actually overlap in how these communities thought about the poor and people with disabilities,
for state laws allowed officials to exclude not only aliens “likely to become a public charge,” but
also “lunatics,” “idiots,” and “infirm” persons. Id. at 3.
90. See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae of Assoc. for Retarded Citizens et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(No. 84-468), 1985 WL 669791, at *2 (“The states forthrightly and systematically sought to
‘purge society’ of their retarded citizens and by law declared them ‘unfit for citizenship.’ The
Cleburne ordinance, modeled on a 1929 Dallas ordinance, has its origin in this period and—
along with at least twelve similar ordinances in Texas alone—is rooted in the invidious dis-
crimination of that time.”).
91. See, e.g., Peter D. Edgerton, Banishment and the Right to Live Where You Want, 74
U. CHI. L. REV. 1023 (2007). As just one example, Virginia’s antimiscegenation law was de-
ployed to effectuate the banishment of the Lovings. They were sentenced to one year in jail,
with their sentences suspended “on the condition that the Lovings leave the State and not re-
turn to Virginia together for 25 years.” Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967).
92. See generally Lindsay Glauner, Comment, The Need for Accountability and Repara-
tion: 1830–1976: The United States Government’s Role in the Promotion, Implementation, and
Execution of the Crime of Genocide Against Native Americans, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 911, 931
(2002).
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vested in an expulsion industry, and the machinery of expulsion can then be
turned against a variety of populations.
Racial expulsions of the sort conducted against the Chinese share some
characteristics with lynchings: they were an extra-legal effort directed against
a racial minority, and they were often conducted in a highly ritualized fash-
ion.93 Just as lynchings in some places became community-wide events, so,
too, racial purges expressed a mixture of white affinity and patriotic senti-
ment. The people of Tacoma commemorated the Chinese purge by celebrat-
ing it as a holiday one year later, replete with “a parade and torch light
procession.”94 As the Chinese were being driven out, some citizens stopped
and hunted for keepsakes. It was reported that “white women entered the
Chinese shacks and procured souvenirs,”95 already looking ahead to a time
when they could safely, perhaps even wistfully, think back upon Chinese cul-
ture. In Los Angeles, seventeen Chinese men were lynched, their homes were
looted and jewelry taken.96 At times, perpetrators mutilated the bodies of
Chinese victims. This happened in places like Los Angeles, Rock Springs,
Snake River, and Hells Canyon.97
An alleged crime by nonwhites against whites could trigger a broader
purge, and sometimes even a lynching, but was not a necessary component
of a racial purge. Lynchings did play a role in the purges of Chinese residents
in places like Denver, Eureka, and Los Angeles. On October 31, 1880, a
drunken encounter between several white and Chinese residents in a Denver
saloon spilled into the streets.98 As the Chinese men tried to defend them-
selves, more white men joined the fracas.99 By nightfall, thousands of angry
whites had assembled and seized the opportunity to burn down every single
Chinese laundry in the city.100 A similar dynamic occurred in Pierce City,
Missouri, after the 1901 lynching of two black men accused of crimes against
white citizens, when a ringleader hollered, “Come on boys, you with guns—
out to run the niggers out of town.”101 Afterward, black people were warned
that “negroes will not be permitted to live here in the future and that the few
negroes not already expelled will be obliged to go.”102 Likewise, the grisly
scene of disfigured Chinese bodies lying in the streets of Los Angeles or the
93. W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THENEW SOUTH: GEORGIA ANDVIRGINIA,
1880-1930 (1993).
94. HUNT, supra note 59, at 382.
95. Id. at 373.
96. PFAELZER, supra note 12, at 50, 123, 287 (describing how a Chinese doctor “had his
garments ripped from off his person while hanging,” wares were stolen by white gangs, and a
gang of white farmers and schoolboys “rob[bed] and murder[ed]” Chinese miners).
97. P. 169; PFAELZER, supra note 12, at 287.
98. Roy T. Wortman, Denver’s Anti-Chinese Riot, 1880, 42 COLO. MAG. 275, 280 (1965).
99. Id.
100. See id. at 286.
101. KIMBERLYHARPER, WHITEMAN’SHEAVEN 24–26 (2010).
102. Pierce City Mob Drives Out Negroes, S.F. CALL, Aug. 21, 1901, at 1.
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swinging body of Hong Di, a convicted Chinese murderer lynched by a mob
in Chico (p. 4), signifies the worthlessness of Chinese lives.
Whiteness is something that must be performed. After a purge was over,
residents would frequently give public testimony as to how glad they were
that Chinese people had been driven out. In Tacoma, one white woman
thanked the men for driving “away the slaves that had taken the bread from
the people’s mouths and from their children’s mouths.”103 Racial homogene-
ity restored a perception of harmony, and that sense of purity had to be
acknowledged. The same woman, like many others, was grateful that wom-
en’s “eyes no more meet the unclean Chinamen.”104
White residents of Whatcom County similarly celebrated their racial
purge with a torchlight parade, songs, and fireworks.105 “The Chinese are
gone,” announced the local newspaper. “We rejoice.”106 Fire typically played
a major role in places like Tacoma, Truckee, San Jose, and Rock Springs—
not merely in terrorizing the Chinese but also in purifying the community.107
The absolute destruction of migrant encampments or the burning of China-
town signaled a desire to blot out any positive impact the migrants had on
the community, perhaps along with memories of the ruthless actions that
had to be undertaken by white residents to erase the interlopers from histo-
ry. Fire then became a symbolic feature of post-purge commemorations, as
torch-lit processions offered a reenactment of the purification itself.
To the extent that a purge is memorialized or broadcast, it sends a mes-
sage of hierarchy and intolerance. This kind of social injury is lasting to the
extent others perceive a community is unwelcome to outsiders. And this
characteristic renders a purge like other kinds of symbols, signage, or mon-
uments intended to communicate that certain political minorities are inferi-
or.108 After the purge of Tacoma, some citizens were so brazen that they
informed elected officials of exactly what they had done. On May 4, 1885,
John Arthur wrote Governor Squire and crowed, “The Chinese are no more
in Tacoma, and the trouble over them is virtually at an end.”109 This was no
temporary state of affairs, he insisted, but a permanent one: “Tacoma will be
103. PFAELZER, supra note 12, at 225.
104. Id.
105. Relyea, supra note 65.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., PFAELZER, supra note 12, at 170–77.
108. See SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING
SOCIETIES (2018); Micah Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, Charlottesville’s Monuments Are Un-
constitutional, SLATE (Aug. 25, 2017, 9:07 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/08
/charlottesvilles-monuments-are-unconstitutional.html [https://perma.cc/D856-BNXD].
109. PFAELZER, supra note 12, at 222. Arthur then urged the governor to endorse a peti-
tion to President Cleveland about “non-enforcement of the Chinese restriction act.” Letter
from John Arthur to Watson Squire, Wash. Territorial Governor (Nov. 4, 1885),
https://www.washington.edu/uwired/outreach/cspn/Website/Classroom%20Materials/Curricu
lum%20Packets/Asian%20Americans/Documents/28.html [https://perma.cc/Q3ZV-U5W6].
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sans Chinese, sans pigtails, sansmoon-eye, sans wash-house, sans joss-house,
sans everything Mongolian.”110
It is important to note that expulsion is logically connected to detention,
since expulsion requires either explicit or implicit use of force to gather and
relocate human beings. Orders will have to be given and some people can be
expected to resist. The wartime internment of Japanese Americans during
the 1940s illustrates this relationship, despite the Supreme Court’s bizarre
effort to deny that expulsion and detention were linked.111
Seizure is thus a necessary component of expulsion, but we can miss the
connection because the detentions entailed in a purge are often temporary,
requiring little architecture. In both Tacoma and Seattle, groups of Chinese
were gathered near the wharf and then moved wholesale to ships or train sta-
tions or simply the city limits (p. 146). No trace of the detentions remained
after the Chinese had been run out of town (p. 3). It’s only when other goals
are paramount—a punitive objective, or perhaps the need to process the le-
gal claims of detainees—that more infrastructure is needed. At that point,
detention becomes more indefinite and visible.
The day may come when a type of expulsion is thought to be more hu-
mane than detention. Lew-Williams’s picture of early border enforcement in
the North after the Chinese Restriction Act of 1882 highlights this tension.
She tells us that the first known acts of indefinite immigrant detention oc-
curred during this period, as unauthorized Chinese migrants were sent to the
U.S. penitentiary on McNeil Island (p. 85). No law explicitly allowed for this
course of action, since imprisonment was not authorized for violating the
restriction law (p. 85). U.S. marshals simply began bringing captured mi-
grants there, and those actions created a precedent that others found easiest
to follow (p. 85). Once they started detaining more migrants, however, new
problems cropped up. How long should they be detained? Who would de-
cide? What if you wanted to deport someone but no nation would take the
person?
Lew-Williams tells us that about 100 migrants were kept on McNeil Is-
land. Some were tried by local judges, who gave them a variety of sentences
upon conviction. Many migrants were given six-month sentences, but de-
tainees were generally kept there awaiting trial, even after a sentence was fin-
ished, and those who didn’t get a trial were held until further instructions
from the U.S. attorney general (pp. 84–86).
In a very real sense, America’s nineteenth-century lurch toward exclu-
sion pushed us further down a path of complex detention. We are now grap-
pling with the fact that detention crosses over with other forms of inequality.
110. PFAELZER, supra note 12, at 222.
111. Justice Black’s decision in Korematsu insisted that the Court was considering only
orders to leave designated military areas, while the dissenters argued that the exclusion orders
were part of a broader program to drive people of Japanese ancestry to temporary relocation
centers and then camps where they would be detained for a longer, but indefinite, period. Ko-
rematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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It involves, to some degree, separation from other human beings; it can ex-
pose people to greater risk of other deprivations and unequal treatment; and
being detained for too long can lead to fairly predictable financial losses and
psychological damage. Today, being branded an “illegal immigrant”—a term
that didn’t exist before the age of exclusion112—can expose already vulnera-
ble populations to further social pain and sharply limit one’s future rights
and opportunities.
CONCLUSION
The Chinese Must Go recovers an intense period during the nineteenth
century when mostly white communities throughout the American West ex-
pelled Chinese migrants. In doing so, the book adds to our existing under-
standing of racial and political violence in America. It also fleshes out the
cultural and political undercurrents that led to changes in the country’s im-
migration laws and, in turn, spurred the development of constitutional law
inside and outside the courts.
There is good news here as well as bad. On the one hand, the plight of
the Chinese led to the clarification of birthright citizenship that brings for-
mal legal security to the children of migrants and the assurance of some con-
stitutional protections for noncitizens in America.113 On the other hand, it
also crystalized the idea of the border in the public imagination and initiated
the apparatus of border control, spread a new rhetoric of “alien” noncitizens
in our law and politics, and fostered problematic justifications for extralegal
methods to deal with undesirables. Lew-Williams calls this “the scaffolding
of modern American gatekeeping” (p. 240). The legacy of these racial purges
haunts us still.
112. John Hudson, Looking for the First Use of the Term ‘Illegal Immigrant,’ ATLANTIC
(Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/09/looking-first-use-term
-illegal-immigrant/323086/ [https://perma.cc/8AGQ-MMFE].
113. On birthright citizenship, see generally MARTHA S. JONES, BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENS: A
HISTORY OF RACE AND RIGHTS IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA (2018); AYELET SHACHAR, THE
BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP ANDGLOBAL INEQUALITY (2009); Mae M. Ngai, Birthright
Citizenship and the Alien Citizen, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2521 (2007); and Robert L. Tsai, The
Origins of Birthright Citizenship, BOS. REV. (Nov. 9, 2018), http://bostonreview.net/race/robert-
l-tsai-origins-birthright-citizenship [https://perma.cc/B6BE-QS22].
